Pro spravzhniu sut' movnoho pytannia
12/16/2001 | Free Spirit
There are three aspects to the language question in Ukraine: (1) political/legal (one or two offical/state languages); (2) practical (actual state of the Ukrainian language and its use); and (3) individual (rights of individuals who consider themselves Russian-speakers). The three aspects often get confused, but they need not be. Briefly on each.
1. Political aspect.
The legal status of the language is highly important. The outcome of official bilingualism would Russian monolingualism. Why? Because official bilingualism would remove any insentives - for elites as well as your average person east of Galicia - to learn and use Ukrainian. Now Russian-speakers in Kyiv and elsewhere send their children to Ukrainian schools because they *want to.* They *want* their children to know Ukrainian because it is useful when Ukrainian is the state language. This is not forced Ukrainization, this is the state creating incentives to learn the language, this is nation-building. Today, with official monolingualism (Ukrainian only as state language), we have true bilingualism.
Official bilinguilism would spell death to Ukrainian, and also to Ukraine. Politicians who push for official bilingualism realize it perfectly well. Their true goal is Russian monolingualism, not real bilingualism. This goal also opens the way to their larger goal, which is the elimination of the Ukrainian state on the following logic: "we all speak Russian anyway, and we are all "Russian people", why should we bother with two separate states?" That Ukraine has no good reason to exist because Ukrainian are really Russians (part of the greater "Russian/Slavic nation", whatever) is their world view. Language policy is a tool for politicians to make the world look like it "should" (i.e. no independent Ukraine).
Anyone who cares for the existence of Ukraine as a state should oppose official bilingualism for this reason alone.
2. Actual development of Ukrainian language.
The legal status for Ukrainian as the only state/official language is a necessary, but of course not a sufficient condition for Ukrainian language to develop and flourish. Rebirth of Ukrainian will be a matter of decades, a slow and uneven process. This is the reality, the patriots need not lament, and the state needs to be careful not to overdo Ukrainization, but needs to create conditions and positive incentives for language developments (in media, book publishing, textbooks, etc).
Anyone who individually cares about Ukrainian language should just speak it, speak it daily and be proud, and be nice to those he or she is speaking with, regardless of whether they speak Russian or Ukrainian back to you. Hearing good Ukrainian spoken by a friendly person will do more to encourage people to use Ukrainian themselves than all the angry appeals taken together.
3. Individual right.
Finally, the linguistic rights of individuals who consider themselves Russian-speakers is a legitimate concern, but a different matter entirely from the question of official/state language. These rights (to schooling in particular) can be perfectly well guaranteed without official bilingualism. They are now, and this is acknowledged by all respectable international human rights organization who *never* criticized Ukraine's language policy.
Currently approximately 30% of schools teach in Russian, more in the east and the south. This is greater than the number of "census Russians", but less than the number of "Russian-speakers." This must about reflect the preferences of the population because there is no popular protests to speak of. This again shows that many Russophones now *want* their children to go to Ukrainian schools. This is what the proponents of official bilingualism want to change. There is no forced Ukrainization or discrimination of Russian-speakers in Ukraine. Only Russia raises havoc, but this is purely a political move to have Ukraine wither as a state (see item 1).
Maybe in 30 or so years, when Ukrainian "zipretsia na nohy," the question officlal status for Russian can be legitimately raised, and paralles to Switzerland, Canada and other western states drawn. Now our only real parallel is Belarus, and its language situation under official bilingualism is well known.
1. Political aspect.
The legal status of the language is highly important. The outcome of official bilingualism would Russian monolingualism. Why? Because official bilingualism would remove any insentives - for elites as well as your average person east of Galicia - to learn and use Ukrainian. Now Russian-speakers in Kyiv and elsewhere send their children to Ukrainian schools because they *want to.* They *want* their children to know Ukrainian because it is useful when Ukrainian is the state language. This is not forced Ukrainization, this is the state creating incentives to learn the language, this is nation-building. Today, with official monolingualism (Ukrainian only as state language), we have true bilingualism.
Official bilinguilism would spell death to Ukrainian, and also to Ukraine. Politicians who push for official bilingualism realize it perfectly well. Their true goal is Russian monolingualism, not real bilingualism. This goal also opens the way to their larger goal, which is the elimination of the Ukrainian state on the following logic: "we all speak Russian anyway, and we are all "Russian people", why should we bother with two separate states?" That Ukraine has no good reason to exist because Ukrainian are really Russians (part of the greater "Russian/Slavic nation", whatever) is their world view. Language policy is a tool for politicians to make the world look like it "should" (i.e. no independent Ukraine).
Anyone who cares for the existence of Ukraine as a state should oppose official bilingualism for this reason alone.
2. Actual development of Ukrainian language.
The legal status for Ukrainian as the only state/official language is a necessary, but of course not a sufficient condition for Ukrainian language to develop and flourish. Rebirth of Ukrainian will be a matter of decades, a slow and uneven process. This is the reality, the patriots need not lament, and the state needs to be careful not to overdo Ukrainization, but needs to create conditions and positive incentives for language developments (in media, book publishing, textbooks, etc).
Anyone who individually cares about Ukrainian language should just speak it, speak it daily and be proud, and be nice to those he or she is speaking with, regardless of whether they speak Russian or Ukrainian back to you. Hearing good Ukrainian spoken by a friendly person will do more to encourage people to use Ukrainian themselves than all the angry appeals taken together.
3. Individual right.
Finally, the linguistic rights of individuals who consider themselves Russian-speakers is a legitimate concern, but a different matter entirely from the question of official/state language. These rights (to schooling in particular) can be perfectly well guaranteed without official bilingualism. They are now, and this is acknowledged by all respectable international human rights organization who *never* criticized Ukraine's language policy.
Currently approximately 30% of schools teach in Russian, more in the east and the south. This is greater than the number of "census Russians", but less than the number of "Russian-speakers." This must about reflect the preferences of the population because there is no popular protests to speak of. This again shows that many Russophones now *want* their children to go to Ukrainian schools. This is what the proponents of official bilingualism want to change. There is no forced Ukrainization or discrimination of Russian-speakers in Ukraine. Only Russia raises havoc, but this is purely a political move to have Ukraine wither as a state (see item 1).
Maybe in 30 or so years, when Ukrainian "zipretsia na nohy," the question officlal status for Russian can be legitimately raised, and paralles to Switzerland, Canada and other western states drawn. Now our only real parallel is Belarus, and its language situation under official bilingualism is well known.