Відповіді

• 2007.05.28 | Горицвіт

  Задовбали своїм міфом про експорт демократії

  Міф полягає в тому, що американці через фінансування своїх НГО зробили демократичні революції в Україні, Югославії і Грузії і скрізь. Це брехня, яка виражається, наприклад, в цій цитаті:
  
  > [...] організацій громадянського суспільства на Україні, де вони очолювали демократичну революцію в 2004 році [...]
  
  Які організації очолювали революцію в 2004 році? Хтось може назвати ці організації? Скільки з них отримували гранти? Скільки з цих грантів було від американського уряду? Ясно, що каськівам вигідно брехати, що вони очолювали. А грантодавцям вигідно брехати, що їхні грантовзявці очолювали. Але скільки може брехня тривати? Невже не ясно, що вона спотворює сприйняття дійсності?
  
  Тому всі "здивувалися", що в Білорусі "така точно" тактика не спрацювала. Шо такоє? Так само дали купу бабок (абсолютна більішсть яких була розікрадена) і що? А революції не сталося! Може, модель не відповідає дійсності? Може, треба подивитися на реальність не через трансляцію каськівих і відірваних від реальності совєтологів?
  згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

  • 2007.05.28 | Горицвіт

    продовження (про москалів і суверенну демократію)

    Кремлівський режим підхопив цей міф і потужно його тиражує. У їхній інтерпретації виходить так: злобний Захід нападає на Росію шляхом експорту демократії. Напали на Сербію - і знищили її, насадивши демократію. Те саме з Грузією і Україною. Кальцо вокруг Рассіі сжимаєтца. Враг уже на граніце.
    
    Тому в Росії офіційна пропаганда вважає, що "демократія" - це тільки інша назва війни. Побєділі нємцев - побєдім і дємократію. А засобом наступу, як ми вже знаємо, є грантоїди.
    
    Тому в Росії сильно притиснули НГО. Заборонивши, наприклад, закордонні ґранти. Цим, мабуть, пояснюється цей пасаж:
    
    > кошти для Росії, де, як пише газета, "продемократичні та правозахисні НПО піддаються величезному тиску", скорочені більш ніж на 50%.
    
    Скорочені, бо в Росії нема кому ці кошти приймати (це заборонено законом).
    
    
    Отже, маємо вже три сторони нашого міфа про експорт демократії.

  • 2007.05.28 | Пані

    От якраз стаття в тему

    Причому з книги фінансованої саме американським фондом (неурядовим!)
    Там один розділ так і зветься - Міф про НГОшну революцію
    
    Це з свіжої книжки
    Reclaiming democracy
    Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe
    2007 by German Marshall Fund
    
    WHERE NEXT OR WHAT NEXT
    .
    Ivan Krastev
    
    The beginning of the 21sl century was marked by an explosion of electoral revolutions item Europe. A "bulldozer" revolution put an end to the criminal regime of in Milosevic in Serbia. The Rose Revolution changed the color of the political me in Georgia and the Orange Revolution brought an end to kleptocratic rule in Kyiv. All three revolutions were nonviolent, liberal and pro-western. They looked the second coming of 1989.
    
    The color revolutions captured the imagination of the West with the promise that liberal democratic revolutions can even be successful in countries with troubled pasts, post-conflict presents and where institutions are weak and incomes low. At the very moment the idea of liberal democratic revolution was both defeated and edited in the Middle East, true-believers of universal democracy found their hopes fulfilled and spirits lifted by events in Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia and Ukraine were viewed as leaders of a new wave of democratic change in the world. The anti-Syrian electoral revolution in Lebanon further strengthened this impression.
    
    In the view of many democracy activists the only relevant questions were how many more weeks in power Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Minsk would survive and where the next color revolution would take place. Political theorists and democracy activists were convinced that color revolutions were a pattern for democratic change that would spread all over Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Replicating color revolutions is the winning strategy for the future.
    
    At the time, these color revolutions were varyingly conceptualized as a) liberal revolutions, b) EU inspired revolutions, c) NGO revolutions and d) a model for the generation of democratic revolutions. Two years on, all these ideas about color revolutions require profound rethinking.
    
    It could turn out that, in their nature, these color revolutions have more in common with the recent populist revolutions in Latin America, than with the liberal revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe of 1989. NGO-centric interpretations of the color revolutions have so far tended to be a marriage of ideological convenience and I institutional self-interest, more than a fair reflection on the real strength of the civil society actors involved. And, the notion that color revolutions represent a model of democratic change that can be replicated might not only be incorrect, but even dangerous, if considering how to develop strategies for assisting democracy in the post-Soviet space.
    
    In accepting color revolutions as the new paradigm for democratic change m runs the risk of making the same mistake as when one universalizes Central European political experience. It took the democratic community the failure in Iraq, Hamas' victory in Palestine and the wave of populist revolutions in Latin America to see the obvious. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a western liberal democracies and market economies in Central Europe are events that cannot simply be "replicated" in regions like the Middle East or Central Asia. As Francis Fukuyama, the disillusioned prophet of "the end of history" bitterly remarked in his latest book, "(...) the democratization of Central Europe was a miracle. And, one can react to a miracle either by dramatically raising expectations for a repeat-effect or by being grateful, pocketing one's luck, and reflecting on the uniqueness of circumstance. Unfortunately, the democracy promotion community shared the first reaction, and tried to turn the miracle into a natural law".
    
    Is this mistake to be repeated? Is it not wiser to pocket one's luck and to reflect on the uniqueness of circumstance when it comes to drawing lessons from the color revolutions that have already taken place, instead of raising expectations of repeat-effects? Has the music stopped playing, without the dancers realizing?
    
    The central argument of this chapter is that in their nature color revolutions are not liberal democratic revolutions. What has been witnessed in the post-Soviet space was not a new wave of democratic revolutions, but the collapse of the hybrid regimes that emerged out of the ruins of the partial democratization of the 1990s. This collapse took the form of democratic breakthroughs in Georgia and Ukraine, but it led to the consolidation of authoritarian trends in Russia and Central Asia. The failure of the revolutionary strategy in the case of Belarus was just the first warning signal for the limits of the color revolution as a model for breaking authoritarian regimes and promoting democracy.
    
    In the view of this author, therefore, the real question is not where the next color revolution will take place, but how the new post-revolutionary strategy for democracy promotion in Eastern Europe should be articulated.
    
    Liberal Revolutions?
    
    What most political observers registered, but failed to emphasize sufficiently was that color revolutions were revolts against semi-autocratic and not autocratic regimes. In 1989 the people on the streets of Budapest and Prague demanded free multi-party elections, freedom of speech and a free market economy. The slogans on the streets of Tbilisi and Kyiv were different. They protested against regimes that called themselves democracies, looked like democracies, but were anti-democratic in their nature. These were regimes where citizens had the right to vote, but the governments reserved for themselves the privilege of counting the votes and announcing the results. Ukrainians and Georgians protested, not against totalitarian regimes, but "democracy's doubles". Disappointment and disillusionment with postcommunist democratization from the above was the major underlying cause for the eruption of the protests.
    
    Color revolutions had more in common with the wave of populist revolutions that e in Latin America than with the velvet revolutions of Eastern Europe. The color revolutions expressed a strong desire for change, but not necessarily a desire e democracy, let alone more capitalism. The people on the streets of Kyiv, unlike the people on the streets of Central Europe in 1989 (but, like populist voters In America today), were asking for the revision of the privatization process, not for more privatization. They were fighting corruption, not communism. Democratic ideals played only a limited role in mobilizing support for the color revolutions, whose victors won power as opposition movements rather than as democratic movements. As Michael McFaul has observed, their "main message was a cry of 'Enough!' hurled f the incumbent power-holders".
    
    Surprisingly, the similarities between Eurasia's color revolutions and the recent dramatic changes in Latin America have remained largely unnoticed or neglected. Observers have been blinded by the fact that the Orange Revolution was led by a market liberal like Yushchenko, while Latin America's electoral revolutions have been led by leftists sympathetic to Fidel Castro. The similarities between Ukraine and Latin America were also obscured by the fact that anti-elite rhetoric in Ukraine spoke in anti-Russian tones, while in Latin America anti-elitism speaks the language of anti-Americanism.
    
    But, regardless of these and many other differences, the color revolutions stand closer to their Latin American relatives than to their Central European forebears. Claims about fraud and not about the future were at the core of political discourse. Ukrainian voters contested the fraudulent elections and, therefore, took to the streets during the Orange Revolution. The angry electorates in Latin America protested not against the neo-liberals and their policies, but against the fraud and the "violin politics" of the establishment. As Jose Maria Aznar, former Prime Minister of Spain once said, exercising power in Latin America during the last decade and a half has been playing a violin. One takes the violin with one's left hand, but one plays it with one's right.
    
    The distinctive feature of the new politics is that the new populist majorities do not have a clear project for transforming society. They are inspired, not so much by the hope as by a sense of betrayal. They are moralistic, not programmatic. They represent the crisis of traditional political identities. In their view, social and political change is possible only through a sea change in the elite. The absence of new ideas and of a new vision for society has resulted in rising pressure to put new people into power. The war cry of the new protest politics is Hugo Chavez's electoral slogan: “Get rid of them all!".
    
    The color revolutions, unlike the velvet revolutions, are not manifestations of the victory of liberal ideas, but are symptomatic of the emerging tension between the concept of people power and the representative institutions of liberal democracy. Like the Latin American revolutions, the color revolutions represent protest against the disempowerment of the people, but in a democratic context. They were revolutions demanding democracy, at the same time as rejecting "the real-fife democracy" they experienced in the last decade. The populist nature of the color revolutions Is at least part of the explanation for the difficulty the new leaders have had to consolidate revolutionary gains in the post-revolutionary period.
    
    Today, two years after the Orange Revolution in Kyiv and seven years after anti-Milosevic "bulldozer" revolution in Serbia, the time has come to face reality of post-Orange society. It is, of course, fair to say that Ukraine today is more democratic than it was two years ago. There is a free and lively media environment, the government is more accountable than ever before and the separation of p1 functions better than previously, but the euphoria that accompanied the revolution and the hopes that it raised have dissipated. The popular mood ranges from despair, anger and cynicism among the revolution's supporters to confusion, d and disillusionment among the revolution's opponents. Increasingly, Ukrainians a giving up on all their leaders and treating their promises as empty. In geopolitical terms, Kyiv is creeping back into Russia's sphere of influence, while the reformist momentum has stowed to a crawl.
    
    Georgia, in contrast, is firmly anchored in the West and its government strives for NATO and EU membership. But, the authoritarian tendencies in the Georgian government are too obvious to be neglected and some NGO leaders claim that the new government is less open to criticism than the "authoritarian regime" it has overthrown. Serbia, for its part, has failed to reconcile its nationalistic past, and while competitive political processes exist, liberalism is on the rise.
    
    Meanwhile, contrary to the colorful logic of revolutionary-minded democracy promoters, Lukashenka in Minsk continues to survive, while Moscow has undergone regime change in the opposite direction to that expected. As Jean Cocteau once remarked, "Every revolution begins standing and ends seated".
    
    The Myth of the NGO Revolution
    
    It is hard to understand what makes revolutions so engaging. The story unfolding has been witnessed so many times before: excited crowds, vague slogans and charismatic leaders flicker on the television screen, in a familiar sort of heroic (melo) drama. But, no one is ever prepared for the disappointment that follows. And, it is so tempting to believe that what is being witnessed is a new kind of revolution. The color revolutions were believed to be a new phenomenon, the "NGO revolution'. Wikipedia, the bible of the information society, insists that color revolutions were notable for the important role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and particularly student activist organizations in organizing creative nonviolent resistance. The concept of civil society was as fundamental to the color revolutions as the concept of the "third estate" was for the French revolution. The role played by NGOs was deemed as important for the success of the color revolutions as that played by the Bolshevik party in the success of the 1917 revolution in Russia.
    
    “NGO revolutions are revolutions in the age of globalization and information. It is meaningless to protest against this reality”, wrote Kremlin political technologist, Sergei Markov, "(...) everybody who wants to take part in the politics of the 21st century has to create his own networks of NGOs and supply them with ideology, money and people". NGOs have been conceptualized as the major protagonists of poltical change in the new century. They are viewed as more important than political parties, trade unions or charismatic political leaders. The question, however, is how well-founded this NGO-centric interpretation of the color revolutions actually is.
    
    The birth of the NGO-centric interpretation of the color revolutions was a happy accidental encounter between ideological convenience and institutional self-promotion. If one wants to be written about in history textbooks, it is necessary to ensure that one has something to do with writing them. This is what the NGO leaders did. They were not only among the leaders of the color revolutions, but, more importantly, they have been the most active interpreters of the events. They were the ones fluent in English and in democracy-speak. The anti-political mood, railing in both East and West, has contributed to the success of this NGO-centric interpretation. Political parties have been labelled as representatives of special interests, whereas, the NGOs were the voice of civil society. And, in one of those ironic twists of fate so dear to historians, the prominence of the NGO-interpretation of the color revolution was achieved by the inadvertent collaboration of democracy activists and Kremlin political technologists.
    
    Western pro-democracy foundations were the salesmen of the NGO-centric I interpretation of the color revolution. For them, public acceptance of the critical role played by the NGOs was also recognition of the critical role played by agencies and foundations engaged in democracy assistance in bringing about democratic change. In other words, western foundations cannot be considered disinterested parties, when it comes to the interpretation of the color revolutions. This is also true for the academic centers affiliated to them.
    
    The packaging of the color revolutions as NGO revolutions was also ideologically convenient. The western-funded NGOs were the only openly liberal, pro-democratic and pro-capitalist constituency in the revolution. NGO-centric interpretations of the revolutions made it easy to argue for the primacy of the liberal nature of the political change. The emphasis on the role and the potential of the NGOs as leading actors in the democratic revolutions also drew attention to the transnational nature of the political change in the context of color revolutions. It is no accident that political theorists have devoted much more attention to the role played by the Serbian activists that turned out in Georgia, or the Georgian activists that turned out in Ukraine, than to the social inequality and ethnic tensions these societies demonstrated in the run-up to their democratic breakthroughs. Marketing has overtaken Marxism when it comes to defining the meaning of revolution. But, the revolutionary handbook that was written on the basis of the experience of the color revolutions encourages the democracy promotion community to seize the opportunity for change in places where they lack local knowledge and genuine democratic movements are not available. The existence of an unpopular semi-autocratic regime, splits among the "guys with the guns", an independent media, a unified opposition, a civic sector skilful in the art of popular mobilization and election monitoring capacities were all classified as factors sufficient for the success of a liberal revolution. The new mantra of democratic change has become "all we need is NGOs".
    
    Kremlin political strategists were the other fervent advocates of the view that color revolutions were NGO revolutions. This version of events justified their claims that what the West called revolution, was, in fact, an electoral coup, a covert operation designed and implemented by the western intelligence agencies and their NGO based infrastructure behind the backs of postcommunist societies. NGO-centric interpretations of the color revolutions perfectly fitted the deep belief of the Kremlin's strategists in the primacy of political technologies over political representation.
    
    The pages of this book provide a thorough analysis of NGO activity in each of the countries in the run-up to and during their color revolutions. The case studies provided document what the NGOs did, how they did it and why what they did was important in the course of the revolutions. Nobody can credibly cast doubt on the fact that NGOs were critical in articulating an alternative view of their societies, mobilizing the people, especially young people, and international solidarity for protestors on the streets of Eastern Europe. Their role in election monitoring was also critical. The purpose of this chapter is not to cast aspersions on these analyses. It would be a grave mistake to ignore the role of the NGOs in the success of the color revolutions. But, the intention of this author is to question the belief that NGOs are the central actor in opening up societies. It is this author's conviction that is a clear tendency to overestimate the role of NGOs as agents of democratic changes and to overlook the limits of their influence. The strategy of overselling NGOs can easily backfire, by creating expectations that cannot be fulfilled. Moreover, there seems to exist a shared conviction that the importance of the role of NGOs actors in democracy promotion shall inevitably grow. This, however, contradicts increasingly obvious signs that the NGO moment in democratic politics is in democratic politics is in the process of passing.
    
    In the case of Eastern Europe, most of the politically active NGOs are not membership-organizations. As a rule, most of their funding comes from abroad and they are much more liberal and pro-western than the mainstream of society. The attempt by OTPOR and PORA to enter national politics in the aftermath of the color revolutions in. their countries ended in fiasco. These failures demonstrated the limits of NGO influence. NGOs were important, but they were not the major protagonist of change. What was consciously or unconsciously underestimated by the NGO-friendly analysts is the power of nationalist and populist sentiments in any of these revolutions and the importance of the role played by their political leaders.
    
    "The anti-elite and anti-political language that was critical for the popularity of NGOs in the "long 1990s" has been captured by the populists. In other words, the rise and success of populist parties and the populist agenda presents a direct challenge to the public role of the civil society sector. Liberal ideas were very attractive to societies that were fighting totalitarianism. But, in the age of failed democratization, liberal NGOs are less attractive than the populist alternative. What liberals promise is institutional change. What populists promise is revenge on incumbent political elites. NGOs promote civic participation and deliberation as correction mechanisms for the failures of democracy, while populists promise strong leadership and an unmediated relationship between the leaders and the people. The other factor contributing to the new context, in which pro-democracy NGOs are forced to work, is the strategy of non-democratic forces adopting democracy promotion rhetoric and creating their own NGOs as an instrument for promoting their foreign policy agendas. The creation of Russia-dominated NGO networks, including think tanks, media organizations and development centers, on the territory of the post-Soviet republics, is an essential element of Russia's new policy of domination in the region.
    
    Rethinking Color Revolutions
    
    Color revolutions were critical events in postcommunist Europe, but they were part of a broader trend. What trie advocates of "the new wave of democratic revolutions thesis have failed to grasp is that the common factor in Eastern Europe was new wave of democratization, but the collapse of the hybrid regimes that emerged from the only partial democratization of the 1990s. The color revolutions led to the opening-up of the hybrid regimes in Ukraine and Georgia, but the fuether consolidation of anti-democratic tendencies of the regimes in Russia and the countries of Central Asia is part of the same process. The preventive counter revolution designed by Moscow's political strategists, is an essential part of the legacy of the color revolution.
    The Kremlin basically "agreed" with democracy theorists that hybrid regimes are structurally unstable and are doomed to collapse. In Moscow's view the color revolutions embodied the ultimate threat: long-distance controlled popular revolt, Putin's preventive counter-revolution following the democratic breakthrough In Ukraine marked a profound transformation in the managed democratic regime In Russia. The change in Russia's policy thinking as a result of the Orange Revolution can only be compared to the change that occurred in American policy thinking as a result of 9/11. Moscow's immediate response to the "orange threat" was to exert total control over the media in Russia. At present, there is no single live political talk show on the major TV channels in Russia.
    
    The Kremlin also "agreed" with the democracy theorists' analysis that splits in the elite were a critical factor for the success of the revolution. In Russia, therefore, the response has been the wholesale nationalization of the elite. The oil and gas industries have been put under total government control- And, the Kremlin has made it clear that flirting with the opposition will not be tolerated. The new NGO law adopted by the Kremlin and the creation of the Citizens' Chamber were aimed at establishing control over civil society. The receipt of "political money" from abroad has been criminalized. More importantly, Russia has rejected the idea of the legitimacy of international involvement in the protection of basic human rights. At the same time, the Kremlin has made an effort to bring the NGO sector under control by increasing the state money available to the third sector domesticaily and by drawing a clear line between desirable and undesirable NGOs. Scared by the efficiency of the street protests and especially the political potential of student movements, the Kremlin has shifted away from the politics of de-polarization and has created youth groups trained to supply active support to the government (these include Nashi and the Molodaya Gvardia). The development of the ideology of sovereign democracy is the last element of Moscow's preventive counter-revolution. Sovereign democracy is meant to be the ideological justification of the new regime that has been established in Russia.
    
    The last and most convincing argument for changes towards anti-democracy in Russia is the renewed taste for open repression of the more radical groups challenging the regime that the government seems to have developed. Activists of "The Other Russia" have been beaten and arrested. The message was unambiguous. The time of nonviolent revolutions is over. The Kremlin has shown its readiness to use violence against its enemies. The violent suppression of the pro-democracy riots in Uzbekistan was the most powerful demonstration of this new trend.
    
    Conclusion
    
    The central argument of this chapter is that color revolutions, as important as they were and as inspiring as they were, cannot serve as a model for further democratic breakthroughs in Eastern Europe. The promotion of democracy in the region has entered a new post-revolutionary stage. So, the real question is not "where next?", rather "what next?". A profound change in the geopolitical, ideological and .institutional contexts in which democratization efforts will take place is underway.
    
    The war in Iraq and the rise of anti-Americanism has become a major obstacle the promotion of democracy. U.S. foreign policy is shifting towards "realism". What now matters for U.S. foreign policy are the foreign policies of other countries, rather than their domestic policies. The famous visit of Dick Cheney to Eastern Europe, during which he sharply criticized Russia's backlash against democracy on one day, and on the next, praised the democratic achievements of the even more authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan, is representative of the new reality. "Double standards" will no longer be just an "accusation" against the U.S. administration's approach to such issues. It will be the reality of its approach. This approach will fuel anti-American sentiment and will make U.S.-supported democracy assistance much more vulnerable to criticism and denunciation. At the same time, anti-Americanism will be cynically used by non-democratic governments to discredit pro-democracy groups. These groups will be less and less inclined to accept financial support from abroad for fear of losing their public legitimacy.
    
    The emergence of the post-enlargement European Union is the other important factor that will negatively affect not only the chances for the new wave of democratic breakthroughs in Eastern Europe, but also the chances for the consolidation of the post-revolutionary regimes. The color revolutions were the most powerful demonstration of the European Union's "soft power". The democratic breakthrough in Ukraine, particularly, has revealed an extraordinary paradox: that the European Union is a revolutionary power with transformative power sufficient to overthrow non-democratic regimes at the same time as the majority of its member-states is committed to preserving the status quo. But, at the same time the color revolutions have shown that the EU's soft power, its ability to mobilize and empower people, to inspire their imagination, to affect change via civic example not superior physical force, itself derives from its soft, shifting, borders. The EU's soft power lies in the promise that "If you are like us, you could become one of us". At the moment when soft borders are replaced by hard borders the ability of the EU to inspire will dramatically decline.
    
    Further, the ideological context has changed. The anti-totalitarian liberalism advocating for human rights, free market and the rule of law that was the ideological hegemon of the 1990s is on the retreat. Societies in both Central and in Eastern Europe are in an anti-transition mood. Nationalist and populist ideologies have become worryingly popular among the voting publics. One can observe severe attacks on liberalism and on representative democracy in some of the countries of the region.
    
    The institutional context has also changed. The war on terror has raised fears over the power of non-state actors. Funding of civil society from abroad now meets resistance in different parts of the world. And, the rise of populist parties directly affects the legitimacy of NGOs. Populism, as a worldview, considers society to be ultimately divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and argues that politics is the expression of the general will of the people and that social change is possible only as a radical change of elite. And, ironically enough in this case, liberal NGOs are widely viewed as members of such elites, no matter how reluctant.
    
    The western-supported NGO sector has lost its monopoly on "representing" civil society. In Russia and other countries, a well-coordinated effort on the part of the government to criminalize pro-democracy NGOs, on the one hand, and to promote and finance a government friendly third sector, on the other, is underway. Both the legitimacy and the room for maneuver of the pro-democracy civic sector have shrunk.
    
    "Nothing seems harder to understand about a great revolution than when it is over", wrote Stephen Sestanovic. In the view of this author, his observation is particularly true about the recent wave of color revolutions in Europe. The expectation that color revolutions are a model of political change that can be replicated is false. These historic upheavals signalled not a new wave of democratic revolution but the exhaustion of the "liberal moment" in democratic politics. This does not suggest that the democratization agenda is obsolete or that people will not go out onto the streets demanding their rights. It does, however, suggest that the role of international actors will decline and that the next protagonists of democratic revolutions will probably not be liberal-minded and western-sponsored NGOs. Democratization will not be what it used to be and it is time to face up to it.

• 2007.05.28 | Раціо

  Майте на увазі: джерело - "РИА Новости".

  Перш ніж коментувати, непогано би знати, що написала власне Washington Post.

• 2007.05.28 | Раціо

  А ось що насправді написала Washington Post

  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/27/AR2007052700929.html
  
  Зауважте, для розвитку України в статті перераховано три варіянти, і НМХР найімовірніший саме оцей: "Maybe Ukraine will muddle through; most of its leaders seem more interested in the model of democratic Poland than of Putin's Russia." Звісно, не відцензурувати таку крамолу в Москві не могли.
  
  Смуток у всій цій історії викликають зовсім не скупі американські конґресмени, а грюкнуті важким крємльом по голові українські так би мовити інформаційні портали ( http://korespondent.net/main/75295 ) і, з дозволу сказати, інформаційні аґенції ( http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-197351.html )
  
  ==============================================
  Shortchanging Democracy in Ukraine
  The President's 'Freedom Agenda' Is Losing Momentum
  
  By Jackson Diehl
  Monday, May 28, 2007; A17
  
  Amid the wreckage of the Bush administration it's easily forgotten that the export of democracy to formerly unfree societies has not always been a failing policy. For a decade after the end of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies worked through NATO and the European Union to convert 10 post-Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. At the time it wasn't clear that all or even any of them would embrace free elections and free markets. That they did was due in large part to the abundant tutelage, training, aid and tough love provided by the Western alliance.
  
  Lots of people are pointing to Iraq as an example of what happens when attempts at nation-building go wrong. But what happens when it isn't tried -- when the West sees a country struggling to find a new political order after decades of repression and simply decides to back off? In effect, a test of that option is underway far from Iraq, in the biggest country between Western Europe and Russia -- Ukraine.
  
  Three years ago, when the Bush "freedom agenda" was still gaining momentum, Ukraine was a focal point. U.S. funds poured into nongovernmental organizations that were agitating for a free presidential election. When a Russian-sponsored candidate tried to steal the election through blatant fraud, the Bush administration strongly backed the popular protest movement, the Orange Revolution, that eventually forced a new vote. The pro-Western winner of that ballot, Viktor Yushchenko, was for a while a favorite in Washington; there was even a push to put Ukraine on a fast track for NATO membership.
  
  The change from then to now is one measure of how far a demoralized administration has retreated from its ambitions, and from the world outside the Middle East. Last week Ukraine was again in political crisis; the protagonists once again were the pro-Western president, Yushchenko, and his pro-Russian rival, Viktor Yanukovych, who is now the prime minister. Once again crowds gathered in the center of Kiev. There were struggles for control over government buildings, and each side accused the other of plotting a coup. The country seemed to teeter between a compromise agreement on new parliamentary elections -- which was announced yesterday -- and an attempt by one side or both to seize power by force.
  
  The Bush administration and its NATO allies, meanwhile, were nearly invisible. Contact between U.S. officials and the feuding Ukrainians was limited mostly to the U.S. ambassador in Kiev and European affairs officials at the State Department. A senior adviser to Yanukovych who came to Washington last week to lobby for more involvement, former foreign minister Konstantyn Gryshenko, found it hard to get a meeting at the National Security Council or the vice president's office.
  
  "What's needed from the United States, and what has been lacking, is a strong message to all sides that it is in their interest to abide by democratic principles," Gryshenko, a former ambassador to Washington, told me. "The message we're getting is that the United States really doesn't care."
  
  It's not just the lack of phone calls or visits that conveys that disengagement. As the human rights group Freedom House points out in a new report, the administration's foreign aid budget proposal for next year contains big cuts in democracy funding for Europe and Eurasia. In Ukraine, the administration would slash funding for civil society organizations -- that is, the groups that led the democratic revolution of 2004 -- to $6.4 million, reflecting a 40 percent reduction from last year. In Russia, where pro-democracy and human rights NGOs are under enormous pressure from an increasingly autocratic Vladimir Putin, a cut of more than 50 percent is planned.
  
  The retreat is largely a function of the administration's ever-deeper absorption in the Middle East -- a lot of the democracy funding is being shifted there -- and simple demoralization. There's a reluctance to do anything that might help Russia's perceived ally, Yanukovych, who believes he would win any free and fair election. It doesn't help that European governments have lost their willingness to offer more memberships in Western clubs. Both NATO and the European Union have made it clear that Ukraine won't be admitted anytime soon, regardless of how its politicians behave.
  
  What will happen in the absence of Western influence? Maybe Ukraine will muddle through; most of its leaders seem more interested in the model of democratic Poland than of Putin's Russia. Maybe Russia, which will never lose interest in its neighbor, will succeed in converting it into a political satellite, as it tried to do in 2004. Or maybe the chaos in Kiev will deepen, violence will erupt and the country will start to splinter, like Yugoslavia in the 1990s -- or Iraq. If so, it won't be because the United States tried to impose democracy; but it might be because it didn't.

• 2007.05.28 | Чучхе

  грантоїди залишаться без грантів - теж мені проблема...

• 2007.05.28 | Хвізик

  Буш скорочує програми де тільки може

  Ніяк не здатен визнати банкрутства своєї політики у Іраку, то все більше і більше бабла туди спрямовує. Натомість скорочує витрати на науку, освіту, медицину, соціальну сферу... Було би дивним, якби він не скоротив гроші для наших грантоїдів. Причому, пропорція скорочень по всіх напрямах приблизно однакова і становить 30-50%. Тобто, нашим грантоїдам ображатися ні на що - всім скорочено порівну.
  
  Особисто я не думаю, що Бушова допомога Україні була коли-небудь аж настільки істотною, щоб суттєво вплинути на тутешній демократичний процес. Принаймні вплив лиш однієї сім"ї Свистовичів є суттєво істотнішим за вплив політ діяча Джоржа Буша
  згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

  • 2007.05.28 | Чучхе

    а так і є, ці гранти ні на що не впливають

    тільки замініть в своєму дописі Іран на Ірак
    згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

    • 2007.05.28 | Хвізик

      Re: а так і є, ці гранти ні на що не впливають

      Чучхе пише:
      > тільки замініть в своєму дописі Іран на Ірак
      звиняйте, помилився

• 2007.05.28 | Юрій Шеляженко

  Судячи з новини, Майдан-Інформ поповнився

• 2007.05.28 | Юрій Шеляженко

  Оригінал від Солодька: Shortchanging Democracy in Ukraine

  Shortchanging Democracy in Ukraine
  The President's 'Freedom Agenda' Is Losing Momentum
  
  By Jackson Diehl
  Monday, May 28, 2007; A17
  
  Amid the wreckage of the Bush administration it's easily forgotten that the export of democracy to
  formerly unfree societies has not always been a failing policy. For a decade after the end of the Cold War,
  the United States and its European allies worked through NATO and the European Union to convert 10
  post-Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. At the time it wasn't clear that all or even any of
  them would embrace free elections and free markets. That they did was due in large part to the abundant
  tutelage, training, aid and tough love provided by the Western alliance.
  
  Lots of people are pointing to Iraq as an example of what happens when attempts at nation-building go
  wrong. But what happens when it isn't tried -- when the West sees a country struggling to find a new
  political order after decades of repression and simply decides to back off? In effect, a test of that option is
  underway far from Iraq, in the biggest country between Western Europe and Russia -- Ukraine.
  
  Three years ago, when the Bush "freedom agenda" was still gaining momentum, Ukraine was a focal point.
  U.S. funds poured into nongovernmental organizations that were agitating for a free presidential election.
  When a Russian-sponsored candidate tried to steal the election through blatant fraud, the Bush
  administration strongly backed the popular protest movement, the Orange Revolution, that eventually
  forced a new vote. The pro-Western winner of that ballot, Viktor Yushchenko, was for a while a favorite
  in Washington; there was even a push to put Ukraine on a fast track for NATO membership.
  
  The change from then to now is one measure of how far a demoralized administration has retreated from
  its ambitions, and from the world outside the Middle East. Last week Ukraine was again in political crisis;
  the protagonists once again were the pro-Western president, Yushchenko, and his pro-Russian rival,
  Viktor Yanukovych, who is now the prime minister. Once again crowds gathered in the center of Kiev.
  There were struggles for control over government buildings, and each side accused the other of plotting a
  coup. The country seemed to teeter between a compromise agreement on new parliamentary elections --
  which was announced yesterday -- and an attempt by one side or both to seize power by force.
  
  The Bush administration and its NATO allies, meanwhile, were nearly invisible. Contact between U.S.
  officials and the feuding Ukrainians was limited mostly to the U.S. ambassador in Kiev and European
  affairs officials at the State Department. A senior adviser to Yanukovych who came to Washington last
  week to lobby for more involvement, former foreign minister Konstantyn Gryshenko, found it hard to get
  a meeting at the National Security Council or the vice president's office.
  
  "What's needed from the United States, and what has been lacking, is a strong message to all sides that it
  is in their interest to abide by democratic principles," Gryshenko, a former ambassador to Washington,
  told me. "The message we're getting is that the United States really doesn't care."
  
  It's not just the lack of phone calls or visits that conveys that disengagement. As the human rights group
  Freedom House points out in a new report, the administration's foreign aid budget proposal for next year
  contains big cuts in democracy funding for Europe and Eurasia. In Ukraine, the administration would slash
  funding for civil society organizations -- that is, the groups that led the democratic revolution of 2004 -- to
  $6.4 million, reflecting a 40 percent reduction from last year. In Russia, where pro-democracy and human
  rights NGOs are under enormous pressure from an increasingly autocratic Vladimir Putin, a cut of more
  than 50 percent is planned.
  
  The retreat is largely a function of the administration's ever-deeper absorption in the Middle East -- a lot
  of the democracy funding is being shifted there -- and simple demoralization. There's a reluctance to do
  anything that might help Russia's perceived ally, Yanukovych, who believes he would win any free and fair
  election. It doesn't help that European governments have lost their willingness to offer more memberships
  in Western clubs. Both NATO and the European Union have made it clear that Ukraine won't be
  admitted anytime soon, regardless of how its politicians behave.
  
  What will happen in the absence of Western influence? Maybe Ukraine will muddle through; most of its
  leaders seem more interested in the model of democratic Poland than of Putin's Russia. Maybe Russia,
  which will never lose interest in its neighbor, will succeed in converting it into a political satellite, as it tried
  to do in 2004. Or maybe the chaos in Kiev will deepen, violence will erupt and the country will start to
  splinter, like Yugoslavia in the 1990s -- or Iraq. If so, it won't be because the United States tried to
  impose democracy; but it might be because it didn't.
  
  (видибано з однієї розсилки правозахисників)
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  • 2007.05.28 | Раціо

    Мда, чюкчя явно нє чітатєл

• 2007.05.28 | толя дейнека

  на Майдані варто оголосити жалобу